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Abstract. Anticipation of an International Environmental Agreement provides an incentive
for countries to change their production behavior prior to negotiations in order to gain a
favorable bargaining position. Increased historical production figures at the time of negotia-
tions may influence the magnitude of the baseline from which cutbacks will be specified. In this
paper we empirically measure the magnitude of such strategic production behavior in the case
of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. Due to data
limitations we specify a two player Nash–Cournot game between the United States and the
rest of the world. We find evidence of asymmetric strategic behavior, which resulted in a net
increase of aggregate world chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production.
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1. Introduction
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) is
considered to be one of the most successful and important pieces of inter-
national environmental legislation in history. This treaty and successive
agreements place binding limits on the production and consumption of the
main ozone depleting chemicals, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, car-
bon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, hydrofluorocarbons and methyl bro-
mide.1 These chemicals have been widely used as refrigerants, coolants,
aerosol propellants and industrial solvents. All of these compounds are
extremely stable, nonflammable, non-toxic, non-corrosive and cheap to
produce (Benedick 1991). However, their use has resulted in a thinning of
stratospheric ozone around the globe. The resulting increase in the intensity
of UV-rays reaching the surface of the earth may augment skin cancer rates
among humans, decrease plankton production in the oceans, and negatively
affect agricultural production.
The Montreal Protocol and the pursuit of other international environ-
mental agreements affecting the environment has generated an extensive
theoretical literature that examines strategic behavior in the formation of an
international environmental agreement (e.g. Barrett 1990; Carraro and
Siniscalco 1993; Hoel and Schneider 1997).2 Fewer papers have suggested that
the expectation of a forthcoming agreement may lead actors (governments or
sources of pollution) to alter their behavior.3 One reason this may occur is that
environmental agreements often specify cutbacks in the production of
harmful substances relative to a negotiated baseline level of production.4 If
producers anticipate the future adoption of an agreement, forcing them to
reduce their production by a certain amount below some baseline, they may
have an incentive to increase production before the agreement is struck to
influence the choice of baseline adopted in the agreement.
In this paper we examine changes in the strategic behavior of CFC pro-
ducers prior to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987. Because of
severe limitations on the availability of CFC production data, we are forced
to conduct a highly aggregative empirical analysis of the strategic behavior of
United States producers of CFCs and the behavior of producers in the rest of
world for which data are available.
This paper does not attempt to provide formal tests of the specific
hypotheses about anticipatory strategic behavior offered in the theoretical
literature. Rather, the purpose is to examine the implications for such an
agreement and consider methods for empirical measurement of these effects
in the years immediately preceding the Montreal Protocol.
The next section briefly discusses the history of CFCs and provides an
account of the negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol. This section
serves as themotivation for themodel specification given in Section 3. Section 4
provides estimation results and a discussion as to their implications. Section 5
contains some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2. Background
Chlorofluorocarbons were invented in 1928. They made possible the mass
proliferation of air conditioning and refrigeration (Cagin and Dray 1993).
The pattern of global and United States production of CFCs is shown in
Figure 1.5 Production of the rest of the world is obtained by subtracting US
production from global production figures. World production of CFCs rose
from 544 metric tons in 1934 to 812,522 metric tons in 1974 (Alternative
Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study, 1997). This is equivalent
to an average annual growth rate of 23.51% between 1934 and 1974.
In 1974 Molina and Rowland published their research on the breakdown
of CFCs in the earth’s stratosphere and the resulting destruction of ozone
molecules. The USA, followed by Canada, Norway and Sweden, banned the
use of nonessential aerosols in March of 1978. A number of international
scientific conferences that addressed the possible consequences of ozone
depletion were held in years following. In addition the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) pushed to have an international conven-
tion with the goal of negotiating a binding agreement. During these years,
from 1974 until the end of 1982, there was a reversal in the global production
trend. Global production of CFCs declined on average by 3.54% per year.
During this time the ban of CFCs in nonessential uses by the USA, Canada,
Sweden and Norway was followed by a commitment of the European
Community in 1980 to implement a capacity cap and reduce aerosol use by
thirty percent.
An ad hoc working group, convened by UNEP, began to negotiate a
convention on research, monitoring, and data exchange in 1982, but failed
to agree on a protocol for controlling CFCs by 1985. During this time,
however, increased public and political pressure made it apparent that
international diplomatic efforts to negotiate the regulation of CFC pro-
duction was imminent. In March 1985, 43 nations convened in Vienna to
complete work on the first international ozone convention, later titled the
Vienna Convention. This non-binding agreement bound nations to ‘‘take
appropriate measures’’ to protect the ozone layer. More importantly, all
43 signatory nations agreed to renegotiate for a binding agreement in
1987.
The negotiations leading up to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer were marked by the willingness of both the United
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Figure 1. Production of CFC-11 and CFC-12 in the USA and the rest of the world.
States’ and some European governments to reach a binding agreement on the
regulation of CFC production. There was, however, great resistance by
industry groups on both sides of the Atlantic until late in 1986. The major
producers did not ‘‘find enough scientific evidence’’ warranting restrictions on
the production of ozone depleting substances. Richard Benedick, the chief
negotiator for the United States notes that about 3months prior to the
scheduled start of negotiations a coalition of about 500 US producer and user
companies changed their position and supported the international regulation
of CFCs (Benedick 1991). Mostafa Tolba, the head of UNEP, notes that as a
result of this, theUS changed its position and supported a global freeze onCFC
production followed by a series of reductions thatwould lead to a complete ban
(Tolba 1998). He further argues that European chemical industries saw US
industries as being a step ahead of them in developing substitutes for CFCs,
which could endanger their markets (Tolba 1998). Overall, the United States
and EC disagreed over almost every issue at every step along the route to
Montreal (Benedick 1991). The 60 governments participating in the Montreal
negotiations agreed to a binding protocol in 1987. Reductions in the produc-
tion of CFCs were stated in terms of individual countries’ 1986 levels of pro-
duction (United Nations Environment Programme 2000). These reductions
were revised and tightened in later amendments to the protocol.
Shortly after the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, empirical evidence
linking CFCs to the destruction of ozone was found. The search for alternative
compounds was successful and a trade fair on CFC substitutes was held in
Washington, DC in January of 1988. Two months later Du Pont, one of the
main producers of CFCs, announced the phase out of the production of CFCs.
Figure 1 shows a structural break in production during 1982. The
previously stagnant or downward trend now reverted to an upward trend,
resembling production patterns prior to the discovery of the harmful ef-
fects caused by CFCs. From 1983 to 1987, global production of CFCs
grew by an annual average of 6.15%. This change in trend of production
is curious, but alone it does not suggest anticipatory production behavior
on the part of the United States and the rest of the world. However, the
trend reversal does suggest that an empirical investigation into the pos-
sibility of anticipatory behavior is likely to yield interesting results.
3. Model Development
The theoretical model underlying the empirical analysis of this paper is as-
sumed to be a Nash–Cournot model in which each nation/player chooses its
production of CFCs in a particular time period based in part on what it
believes will be aggregate production of CFCs in the rest of the world.6 Each
country’s belief about CFC production in the rest of the world is confirmed
in every time period so that the distribution of production levels across
countries forms a Nash equilibrium in every time period.
Country-specific data on CFC production are not available. Aggregate
global production figures from 1931 to 1995 were compiled via a confidential
reporting mechanism by the Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental
Acceptability Study (AFEAS). This dataset includes aggregate production
figures for producers from the USA, Italy, France, Germany, United King-
dom, Greece, Belgium and Japan and their subsidiaries (AFEAS 1997).7 The
United States Tariff Commission reports production for the United States
from 1958 until the present. Because country-specific production figures are
not available for countries other than the United States,8 we are led to
consider a two-player Nash–Cournot game between the United States and
the rest of the world.
Let Uusa be welfare for the United States and let Urow be welfare for the
rest of the world in some time period. Similarly, let CFCusa be total US
production in a particular time period, and let CFCrow be the corresponding
production for the rest of the world. Then, a pair [CFCusa, CFCrow] is a Nash
equilibrium in a particular time period if the production levels solve (1) and
(2) simultaneously:
max
CFCusa
Uusa ¼ UðCFCusa;CFCrow;Dusa;Pusa;PolicyÞ ð1Þ
max
CFCrow
Urow ¼ UðCFCrow;CFCusa;Drow;Prow;PolicyÞ ð2Þ
Non-production exogenous variables that enter the welfare functions consist
of demand, cost and policy variables for each player, as well as the oppo-
nent’s production for the same time period. Dusa and Drow proxy for CFC
demand side effects. Prow and Pusa indicate the cost of production for each
player. Policy consists of slope dummies for time periods that could possibly
affect pre-treaty behavior of each player.
Assuming for each i  (usa, row) Ui is strictly concave in CFCi, the
standard first-order conditions associated with the simultaneous maximiza-
tion of (1) and (2) implicitly define the Nash best-response functions:
CFCusa ¼ fðCFCrow;Dusa;Pusa;PolicyÞ ð3Þ
CFCrow ¼ fðCFCusa;Drow;Prow;PolicyÞ ð4Þ
These Nash best response functions indicate how each player’s optimal
choice of production of CFCs changes due to a change in any of the
exogenous variables on the right hand side. It is important to note that
each player’s optimal level of production depends on the opponent’s
choice of production for that same time period. The nature of this
dependence and how it changes over time is the primary focus of this paper.
Of particular importance to this analysis is what Bulow et al. (1985) call
‘‘aggressiveness’’. To illustrate this concept, suppose the US producers of
CFCs believe that producers in the rest of the world will increase their
production of CFCs. Bulow et al. (1985) would call the behavior of US
producers aggressive if they respond to this new belief with a significant
increase in their own production; they would be called less aggressive if they
respond with a smaller increase or decrease in production. Note the simple
fact that the slope of their best response function captures the relative
aggressiveness of US producers – a strong positive slope indicates relatively
aggressive behavior, while a weaker, or negative, slope indicates less
aggressive behavior. Of course, all this applies to producers in the rest of the
world as well. An important focus of this paper is whether producers of
CFCs became more or less aggressive in the years preceding the Montreal
Protocol.
The high level of aggregation in this paper raises the question whether the
second player (ROW) can act strategically, since it is a group of countries.
Benedick’s (1991) account suggests that the producers in the European Un-
ion, contained in the AFEAS (1997) dataset, had adopted a joint strategy in
the negotiations. Japan which was responsible for roughly 10% of global
production in 1986 adopted its own negotiating strategy, which followed the
lead of the EU (Benedick 1991). We take this as evidence in support of the
belief that the ROW player conducted coordinated behavior in the negotia-
tions leading up to the Montreal Protocol. In all interpretations it should
therefore be noted that the rest of the world here essentially contains pro-
ducers from the European Union and Japan.
In accordance with the theoretical model, the matrix of explanatory
variables should include exogenous variables that capture the cost and de-
mand effects on the production of chlorofluorocarbons for each player, the
opponent’s production figures, as well as a vector of dummy variables cap-
turing the changes in policy prior to the Montreal Protocol. The economic
model used for later estimation is given in Equations (5) and (6):
CFCusat ¼ fðCFCrow;CFCrow2;CFCrow3;OILt;GDPusat Þ ð5Þ
CFCrowt ¼ fðCFCusa;CFCusa2;CFCusa3;OILt;GDProwt Þ ð6Þ
The left hand side variable for each model (CFCusat and CFC
row
t ) consists
of the combined production of CFC-11 and CFC-12. As outlined in the
theoretical specification of the model in Equations (3) and (4), the United
States react to demand variables unique to the United States. The rest of the
world reacts to a set of variables, which capture effects unique to the pro-
ducers outside of the United States. A summary description of the variables
and their meaning is given in Table I.
As a proxy for demand variables we used Gross Domestic Product for the
United States and the aggregate purchasing power parity adjusted gross
domestic product for countries contained in the AFEAS (1997) sample. This
aggregate measure should be a reasonable proxy for the demandnmarket size
for CFCs in the industrialized countries. We tested all of our series for non-
stationarity using the test proposed by Kahn and Ogaki (1992). We fail to
reject the null of stationarity, but acknowledge the fact that due to the limited
length of the series, any test for stationarity has limited power. We used the
price of oil in terms of 1995 US$ as a proxy for costs of production and
capital. CFCs are a petroleum-based product; therefore, the world market
price of oil should be a good proxy for the costs of inputs to production.
The history of production and consumption of CFCs, the discovery of
their harmful effects on stratospheric ozone, and unilateral and international
efforts leading to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol suggest three very
distinct time periods before the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987.
Summarizing our discussion the three distinct time periods under study are
therefore 1958–1974 (Period I), 1975–1982 (Period II) and 1983–1987 (Period
III). During Period I the hazardous effects of chlorofluorocarbons on the
environment were unknown. There were no policies limiting the production
of these substances in any country. Period II captures the years after the
publication of the paper by Molina and Rowland (1974), which were char-
acterized by increased public attention, but no plans for an International
Environmental Agreement. Period III starts with the year negotiations to-
ward placing binding limits on CFC production and consumption began and
ended with the adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987.9
In order to capture any changes in production behavior during these three
time periods, the Policy variables included in the model consist of two slope
dummy variables. To catch the possible changes in the opponent’s produc-
tion behavior during Period II, the slope shifter variable, CFCrow2 takes on
Table I. Names and description of variables used in estimation
Variable name Description
CFCusa US CFC production in metric tons
CFCrow Rest of the world CFC production in metric tons
CFCusa2 US Slope Dummy 1975–1982
CFCusa3 US Slope Dummy 1983–1987
CFCrow2 ROW Slope Dummy 1975–1982
CFCrow3 ROW Slope Dummy 1983–1987
GDPusa United States GDP (1995 constant US$)
GDProw GDP of ROW countries (1995 constant US$)
OIL Spot market price for barrel of crude oil (1995 constant US$)
the values of CFCrow during Period II. Similarly, the slope shifter variable for
Period III, CFCrow3, takes on the values of CFCrow for the years in Period III.
(CFCusa2 and CFCusa3 are obtained the same way). We assume the best
response functions (5) and (6) and estimate:
CFCusat ¼ b0 þ b1CFCrowt þ b2CFCrow2t þ b3CFCrow3t þ b4OILt
þ b5GDPusat þ et ð7Þ
CFCrowt ¼ c0 þ c1CFCusat þ c2CFCusa2t þ c3CFCusa3t þ c4OILt
þ c5GDProwt þ gt ð8Þ
We fail to reject the null hypothesis of linearity in the right hand side
variables. In this two-player game, the USA and the rest of the world choose
their production simultaneously and the opponent’s choice of production
enters the equation on the right hand side. The disturbance terms are not
independent from all of the variables on the right-hand side in this model. We
estimate Equations (7) and (8) via the three stage least squares (3SLS) esti-
mator. Regressing the endogenous right hand side variables on US and rest
of the world energy usage and intercept dummy variables for Periods I and II
resulted in satisfactory instrumental variables for use in the 3SLS estimation.
4. Results
Table II provides the estimation results and summary statistics. These form
the basis for interpreting how the production behavior of each player
changed with respect to the opponent’s behavior from Period I to Period II
and to Period III. The obtained values indicate a good fit for the model. The
Durbin––Watson statistics fall into the uncertainty region. This may hint at
misspecification issues, which we cannot rule out due to the small sample size.
The parameter estimates are, however, not very susceptible to alternate
specifications.
The main question to be addressed by this paper is if nations did display
anticipatory production behavior prior to the Montreal Protocol. In order to
interpret the estimation results in a way that may answer this question one
needs to look at each player’s individual Nash best response function, and see
if there are any statistically significant shifts from Period I to Period II and
Period III.
The results presented in Table II show that the production behavior of
both players changed with respect to their opponent’s behavior from Period I
(1958–1974) to Period II (1975–1982) and to Period III (1983–1987). The
parameter estimates for CFCrow, CFCrow2, CFCrow3, CFCusa, CFCusa2 and
CFCusa3 are all significant at the 1% level. The parameter estimates for
CFCrow, CFCrow3, CFCusa2 and CFCusa3, which are all jointly significant with
CFCusa and CFCrow respectively, indicate changes in slope of the players’ best
response functions from Period I. A positive parameter estimate for any of
these variables indicates an increase in aggressiveness relative to Period I. An
increase in aggressiveness in this context means that a player will respond to
an increase in production by its opponent by producing relatively
more output than it would have in the original period, assuming a positively
sloped best response function. Should the best response function be nega-
tively sloped, the player would react to such behavior by decreasing its
production by a relatively smaller amount than it would have in the original
time period.
During Period I the United States’ Nash best response function is upward
sloping in its opponent’s production. A one ton increase in the production of
Table II. 3SLS estimation results
Variable Parameter estimate t-Statistic
Reaction function USA
Intercept 180356b 2.57
CFCrow 0.84a 6.50
CFCrow2 )0.23a )5.34
CFCrow3 )0.26a )4.38
GDPusa )31.58 )1.13
OIL )2425.71a )3.46
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.301
df 24
Reaction function ROW
Intercept )186547a )7.09
CFCusa 1.06a 4.15
CFCusa2 0.63a 4.47
CFCusa3 0.72a 2.90
GDProw 30.04c 1.90
OIL )750.18 )0.63
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.518
df 24
R2 (System weighted) 0.9804
a Significant at 1%.
b Significant at 5%.
c Significant at 10%.
chlorofluorocarbons by the rest of the world would cause the United States
to produce an additional 0.84 tons during the years of 1958–1974. This
behavior can be attributed to the mass proliferation of these cheap and
incredibly useful chemicals during this time. Refrigerators as well as air
conditioning units were being mass marketed during this time and there was
a tremendous global demand for these substances.
The parameter estimate for CFCrow2 indicates a decrease in slope of the
United States’ best response function for Period II (1975–1982). As shown in
Table II, the slope decreases by 0.23. For these years after the discovery of
the harmful effects of chlorofluorocarbons, the United States’ producers
would respond to a one ton increase in production by the rest of the world by
increasing their own production by only 0.61 tons. Thus, they became less
aggressive in Period II. This is probably due to the ban of CFCs in non-
essential uses by the United States. It may also have been more costly to
increase production of CFCs for United States producers during this period
because of increased public pressure on the main producers.
Possible changes in slopes of the best response functions during Period III
(1983–1987) will show if nations did in fact change their behavior in antici-
pation of the Montreal Protocol. The estimate for CFCrow3 is )0.26, which
means that each additional ton of CFCs produced by the rest of the world
would result in a 0.58 ton increase in production by the United States. This
result shows that the United States, during the years of 1983 until 1987,
displayed slightly less aggressive production behavior in comparison to
Periods I and II. This less aggressive production behavior could indicate
some strategic behavior on the part of US producers. Even though Benedick
(1991) argues that Du Pont had not yet developed substitutes for CFCs, they
had previously invested significant resources into the development of sub-
stitutes. US producers may have therefore had an edge on rest of the world
producers in the development of substitutes.
The rest of the world’s production behavior can be interpreted in the same
fashion. Table II reveals that during the years from 1958 until 1974, the rest
of the world’s reaction function was positively sloped. The estimate of
CFCusa indicates that for a one ton increase in US chlorofluorocarbon pro-
duction, the rest of the world increased its production by 1.06 tons. Both
players had an upward sloping best response function during Period I. The
estimated slope for each player’s best response function during these years,
0.84 for the United States and 1.06 for the rest of the world, shows that both
players exhibited moderately aggressive production behavior during Period I.
During the years from 1975 until 1982, the Nash best response function of
the rest of the world experienced a sharp increase in slope. This reflects a
significant increase in the aggressiveness of production behavior in the rest of
the world. A one ton increase in production by the United States would have
caused the rest of the world to increase its production by 1.69 tons, which is a
60% increase in slope compared to Period I. This result is probably due to the
fact that most of the producers outside of the United States were not subject
to the ban of CFCs in non-essential uses. The effect may in fact be under-
estimated, since Norway, Canada and Sweden banned the use of CFCs in
nonessential uses during this time period.
The years just prior to the Montreal Protocol (1983–1987) are marked by
another sharp increase in aggressiveness by the rest of the world. The esti-
mate of CFCusa3 indicates that the rest of the world would increase its pro-
duction by 1.78 tons, which is almost a two-fold increase in aggressiveness
compared to Period I and an 13% increase compared to Period II. This result
strongly suggests that producers outside of the United States did change their
production behavior in anticipation of the Montreal Protocol, by displaying
extremely aggressive production behavior. It may have been politically easier
for European producers to increase production of CFCs, since many Euro-
pean governments were not as supportive of the Protocol as the USA,
Canada, Norway, Sweden and Germany (Benedick 1991).
The parameter estimates on OILt indicate that an increase in the price of
oil will result in decreased production of chlorofluorocarbons. Even though
the parameter on OIL for the rest of the world is not significant, it carries the
correct sign. The parameter on the demand variable (GDPt) for the rest of the
world is significant and carries the expected sign. This indicates that CFCs in
the rest of the world are a normal good. The parameter estimate for the USA
is not significant.10
To better demonstrate the changes in aggresiveness, Figure 2 shows a
graphical representation of both players’ best response functions for the three
different periods. In order to demonstrate the changes and shifts of these
reaction functions that are due to anticipatory production behavior, GDPt
and OILt are held constant at their sample mean. The continuous time
dimension from 1958 until 1987 is now split up into three distinct time
periods.
Figure 2 shows that while the United States’ producers of CFCs became
less and less aggressive as the negotiations for a global treaty approached, the
rest of the world displayed more aggressive production behavior. This
behavior gives strong reason to believe that producers of CFCs did change
their production behavior in anticipation of the Montreal Protocol.
The interpretation of the production parameters is intriguing and may
allow us to draw conclusions about the pre-treaty behavior of the USA and
the rest of the world. Figure 3 shows the impact of the purely strategic
changes in production behavior from Period I to Period III.
The net total increase in emissions due to strategic changes in behavior
from Period I to Period III is about 200,000 tons of CFC for the 4 years
preceding the Montreal Protocol. The strategic effect is possibly underesti-
mated, since Canada, Norway and Sweden, who banned CFCs in non-
essential uses during Period II contained local subsidiaries of producers
whose production is captured in the rest of the world data.
5. Conclusions
The intention of this paper was to test for possible anticipatory production
behavior by chlorofluorocarbon producing nations prior to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. In order to test
for such behavior we assumed a simple period-by-period two-player
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Figure 3. Impact of strategic behavior on the production of CFCs.
Nash–Cournot game between the United States of America and the rest of
the world. The estimation results presented in Table II suggest that both
players did exhibit a strong, asymmetric and statistically significant change in
behavior during the years just prior to the Montreal Protocol in 1987.
US producers became less aggressive in the years preceding the Montreal
Protocol, while producers in the rest of the world became more aggressive.
The likely explanation for these behavioral changes have to do with the
enactment of a unilateral control on the production of CFCs in the United
States that followed quickly after the first hint in 1974 that CFCs could
destroy atmospheric ozone. Less aggressive behavior by US producers during
1975–1982 apparently resulted from the ban on non-essential uses of CFCs in
the United States. More aggressive behavior by producers in the rest of the
world resulted as they moved to capture part of the market previously held
by US producers. The empirical analysis strongly suggests asymmetric
anticipatory production behavior.
The outcome of this research has important implications for the future
development of policies regulating transboundary pollutants. If countries do
anticipate International Environmental Agreements as suggested by this re-
search nations who do not display anticipatory behavior will most likely be
required to cutback a larger relative share, ceteris paribus. Therefore it will
make these nations worse off from a welfare point of view in the long run.
The scope of the empirical analysis in this paper does not allow us to estimate
the overall impact of such behavior on global welfare. We estimate, however,
that anticipatory behavior is responsible for a predicted increase of 200,000
tons of CFCs, which is roughly 1% of aggregate global CFC production
from their invention until today.
The high level of aggregation of the data set does not allow us to study
the exact nature of strategic behavior. Plant level production data
would allow us to estimate a capacity withholding model, similar to
the models used in the literature on electricity deregulation (e.g. Harvey
and Hogan (2001), Joskow and Kahn (2001)). Our analysis suggests
that producers in the United States had an incentive to withhold produc-
tion capacity just prior to the Montreal Protocol, whereas producers in
the European Union had an incentive to push production past economi-
cally profitable levels – in actuality or on paper. To separate this effect we
would require plant or company level data, which is currently unavailable to
us.
Future negotiations leading to International Environmental Agreements
must take into account the incentives inherent in the process of negotiating
treaties specifying cutbacks from a baseline year to avoid such changes in
production behavior.
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Notes
1. Chlorofluorocarbons are also one of the largest contributors to the greenhouse effect.
2. The empirical literature on international environmental agreements is rather scant.
Murdoch and Sandler (1997a) and Murdoch and Sandler (1997b) have examined the
reductions of CFCs and sulfur dioxide before the reductions mandated by their respective
international agreements went into effect. Congleton (1992) examined the impact of
political institutional arrangements on international environmental regulation. No paper
has addressed the issue of anticipatory behavior prior to an international environmental
agreement that is the subject of this paper.
3. See Copeland (1990); Buchholz and Konard (1994), and Stranlund (1999). This literature
is entirely theoretical; no attempt has been made to look for empirical evidence of changes
in behavior prior to an international environmental agreement.
4. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, states cutbacks in terms of 1990 CO2 equivalent
emission levels.
5. We limit our analysis to CFC-11 and CFC-12, which are the two main sources of ozone
depletion prior to the Montreal Protocol.
6. In both the theoretical and empirical literature on international environmental agree-
ments, it is common to assume that decisions are made at the national level.
7. The countries, which contained at least one subsidiary of said producers produced
approximately one sixth of the amount produced in the eight main countries listed and
accounted for less than 15% of global production in 1986.
8. Country level production data is available after 1986 in United Nations Environmental
Programme Ozone Secretariat (2002).
9. Since the date of the break from Period II to Period III is not quite as clear as the first
break we conduct a predictive Chow test and confirm that a statistically significant break
at the 1% level occurred in 1983.
10. Mason and Swanson (2001) provide an Environmental Kuznets Curve model of CFC
consumption/emissions across countries and show that an in sample turning point does
exist for some specifications. Since the EKC analysis is conducted in per capita terms, the
sign of the parameter in this paper depends on where individual countries are with respect
to income as well as the level of population since we use aggregate GDP. We further note
that Mason and Swanson (2001) rely on estimated data from the usage of inputs, which is
not available for the years covering Period I.
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